We propose a formal framework for the security analysis of on-demand source routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks. Our approach is based on the well-known simulation paradigm that has been proposed to prove the security of cryptographic protocols. Our main contribution is the application of the simulation-based approach in the context of ad hoc routing. This involves a precise definition of a real-world model, which describes the real operation of the protocol, and an ideal-world model, which captures what the protocol wants to achieve in terms of security. Both models take into account the peculiarities of wireless communications and ad hoc routing. Then, we give a formal definition of routing security in terms of indistinguishability of the two models from the point of view of honest parties. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by analyzing two "secure" ad hoc routing protocols, SRP and Ariadne. This analysis leads to the discovery of as yet unknown attacks against both protocols. Finally, we propose a new ad hoc routing protocol and prove it to be secure in our model.
INTRODUCTION
Several "secure" routing protocols have been proposed in the recent past for wireless ad hoc networks [19, 12, 13, 22, 24] . However, the security of those protocols have been analyzed either by informal means only, or with formal methods Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. that have never been intended for the analysis of this kind of protocols (e.g., SRP was analyzed with BAN logic [6] in [19] ). This has at least two annoying consequences:
1. There is no clear (meaning formal) definition of the term "secure routing". Therefore, different authors interpret security in different ways, and design their routing protocols with different requirements in mind.
As a consequence, the properties of different proposals are difficult to compare.
2.
There is no mathematically rigorous way to prove a proposed routing protocol secure. In fact, many of the proposed protocols (e.g., SRP and Ariadne) are flawed in the sense that they do not achieve the properties claimed by their authors; a clear consequence of the lack of a sound proof technique.
The situation described above is somewhat similar to the situation that one could have witnessed in the field of session key establishment protocols in the early 1990's. There, the solution was to come up with definitions and proof techniques on solid mathematical grounds [3, 4, 5, 23, 1] . In this paper, we follow a similar approach, and make the first steps towards a formal model in which one can precisely define what secure routing means and prove (or fail to prove) that a given protocol indeed satisfies that definition (under some cryptographic assumptions). An extended version of this paper is available as a technical report [8] , which contains some details that we had to leave out here due to space limitations.
The organization of the paper is the following: We overview our approach and main contributions in Section 2. We present our model and the formal definition of secure routing in Section 3. We demonstrate the usage and usefulness of our model in Section 4, where we analyze SRP and Ariadne, we describe previously unknown attacks against both protocols, we propose a novel routing protocol, and we prove it secure in our model. In Section 5, we report on related work, and finally, in Section 6, we conclude the paper and give some outlook to the future.
all its details in a particular computational model, and an ideal-world model, which describes the protocol in an abstract way mainly focusing on the services that the protocol should provide. One can think of the ideal-world model as a description of a specification, and the real-world model as a description of an implementation. Both models contain adversaries. The real-world adversary is an arbitrary process, while the abilities of the ideal-world adversary are usually constrained. The ideal-world adversary models the tolerable imperfections of the system; these are attacks that are unavoidable or very costly to defend against, and hence, they should be tolerated instead of being completely eliminated. The protocol is said to be secure if the real-world and the ideal-world models are equivalent, where the equivalence is defined as computational indistinguishability from the point of view of the honest protocol participants. Technically, security of the protocol is proven by showing that the effects of any real-world adversary on the execution of the real protocol can be simulated by an appropriately chosen ideal-world adversary in the ideal-world model.
Contributions. Our main contribution is the application of the approach described above to ad hoc routing protocols. We formally define the real-world and the ideal-world models that capture the basic features of wireless ad hoc networking in general, and ad hoc routing protocols in particular. Another contribution of this paper is the analysis of two "secure" routing protocols proposed for ad hoc networks: SRP [19] and Ariadne [12] . This analysis leads to the discovery of as yet unknown attacks against both protocols, and clearly shows the usefulness of our proposal. Finally, we propose a novel on-demand source routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks, which can be proven to be secure in our model. This protocol should be viewed as a side effect of our analysis of SRP and Ariadne, and it serves purely illustrative purposes in this paper. However, it has some noteworthy features, and we hope that it will inspire protocol designers when building their future protocols. Now, we overview the main novelties of our model with respect to the models proposed so far for the analysis of cryptographic protocols in the context of the simulationbased approach.
• Communication model: One main difference lies in the underlying network model. Most of the models proposed so far represent the network through which the protocol participants communicate as a single buffer, in which the participants place messages, and from which these messages are eventually delivered to their intended recipients. However, the single buffer model abstracts away the multi-hop operation of the network, and hence, it is not appropriate for our purposes. The peculiarities of wireless networks that we have to deal with include the broadcast nature of radio communications, which allows a party to overhear the transmission of a message that was not intended to him. On the other hand, a radio transmission can usually be received only in a limited range around the sender.
• Adversary model: In the models proposed so far, the adversary has full control over the communications of the honest protocol participants. This means that it can read, modify, or delete any of the messages sent between protocol participants, and it can also send fake messages to any protocol participant. This may be an appropriate model in Internet-like networks, where having access to some special network elements, such as routers, allows the adversary to have this level of control. On the other hand, in wireless ad hoc networks, an adversary can have a similar level of control over the communications only if it is physically present everywhere. In many applications, this is considered to be very costly, and hence, unrealistic. Therefore, we assume that the adversary has communication capabilities comparable to those of an average node in the ad hoc network. This means that an adversary can hear only those messages that were transmitted by neighboring nodes, and similarly, the transmissions of the adversary is heard only by its neighbors.
• Model of computation: In the models proposed so far, usually the adversary schedules the activities of the honest parties. This is so, because many protocols are message driven, and by controlling the communications, essentially, the adversary decides which honest party can do some computation and when. On the other hand, in our model, the adversary has no full control over the communications. Therefore, in our model, the protocol participants (and the adversary) are activated by a hypothetic scheduler. In addition, this activation is done in rounds: in each round, each participant is activated once. This leads to a sort of synchronous model, where each participant is aware of a global time represented by the current round number. We hasten to note, however, that knowledge of the current round number is never exploited in our analysis. The advantage is that we can retain the simplicity of a synchronous model, without arriving to conclusions that are valid only in synchronous systems.
• The ideal-world model: The simulation-based approach requires the definition of an ideal-world model, which focuses on what the system should do, and it is less concerned about how it is done. As a consequence, the ideal-world model usually contains a trusted entity that provides the services of the system in a "magical" way. Hence, when trying to apply the simulation-based approach to ad hoc routing protocols, one faces the problem of describing what such protocols should do in an abstract way. However, this seems to be a particularly difficult problem. This is so because many factors affect the output of ad hoc routing protocols even in the absence of an adversary, including the variable processing time of the nodes, mobility, and optimizations (such as replying from route caches in DSR [15] ). Requirements such as the one that the protocol should always return the shortest route between two nodes are simplistic, and in fact, no real protocol satisfies them. Therefore, instead of describing the expected output of an ideal routing protocol explicitly, our ideal-world model captures only the requirement that, ideally, non-existent routes should never be returned to honest parties. This coincides with the approach of [19] and [12] , where this requirement was stated informally. In fact, the trusted entity in our ideal-world model simulates the behavior of the real network, with the difference that it never returns nonexistent routes to honest parties (it has a "magical" capability of filtering them out). In addition, we do not limit the capabilities of the ideal-world adversary, but those are the same as the capabilities of a realworld adversary. More discussions on these modelling decisions can be found in [8] .
MODEL
We consider an ad hoc network of wireless devices. We assume that the radio links between the devices are symmetric, by which we mean that if device v can receive the radio transmission of device v , then v can receive the radio transmission of v too. We further assume that each device has a single and unique identifier, which is used, notably, in the neighbor discovery protocol and in the routing protocol. We denote the set of all identifiers by L.
It is convenient to represent an ad hoc network with an undirected labelled graph G = (V, E, L), where V is the set of vertices, E is the set of edges, and L : V → L is a labelling function. Each vertex represents a device, and there is an edge between two vertices v and v , if the corresponding devices can receive each other's radio transmission. Function L assigns to each vertex the identifier of the corresponding device. Since identifiers are unique, L must be a bijection.
If W ⊆ V , then we will use the shorthand L(W ) to denote the set {L(v) : v ∈ W } of identifiers assigned to the vertices in W . We introduce a function NG : V → 2 V that returns the set of neighboring vertices of a given vertex in
We make the common assumption that during the execution of a route discovery process, G does not change. Thus, we view the route discovery part of the routing protocol as a distributed algorithm that operates on G. The algorithm is run by the devices with the aim of finding routes (i.e., sequence of identifiers assigned to the vertices) in G, while of course, each device has only a partial knowledge of G. In some routing protocols, the routes found by the protocol are not returned explicitly, but they are represented implicitly in the state of the devices in form of routing tables. In this paper, we will not be concerned with this kind of protocols. We rather focus on source routing protocols, where the routes are returned explicitly. More specifically, we will be concerned with the route discovery part of on-demand source routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks. We leave the study of other kinds of ad hoc routing protocols for future work.
We assume an adversary A that wants to subvert the routing service. We assume that A interacts with the system through a single corrupted device. We further assume that A is static, meaning that no further corruption happens during the operation of the system. According to the classification introduced in [12] , our adversary is an Active-1-1 attacker 1 . The more general Active-x-y case and adaptive adversaries are left for future work.
We denote by n the cardinality of V minus 1 (i.e., |V | = n + 1). We denote the vertex that represents the corrupted device byṽ, and the vertices that represent the non-corrupted devices by v1, v2, . . . , vn. The pair (G,ṽ) is called a configuration. 1 An Active-x-y attacker is an adversary that has compromised x devices and owns y devices to which it has distributed data (e.g., authentication keys) obtained from the compromised devices.
Real-world model
The real-world model that corresponds to a configuration conf = (G,ṽ) and adversary A is denoted by sys real conf ,A , and it is illustrated on the left side of Figure 1 . sys real conf ,A consists of a set {M1, M2, . . . , Mn, H, A, C} of Turing machines interacting via buffers (or tapes). Each Mi represents the non-corrupted device that corresponds to vertex vi in G, H is an abstraction of higher-layer protocols run by the honest parties, and A is the adversary, which encompasses the corrupted device corresponding toṽ. Machine C models the radio links represented by the edges of G; it moves messages between the buffers that are connected to it. All machines apart from H are probabilistic.
Each machine is initialized with some input data, which determines its initial state. In addition, the probabilistic machines also receive some random input (the coin flips to be used during the operation). Once the machines have been initialized, the computation begins. The machines operate in a reactive manner, which means that they need to be activated in order to perform some computation. When a machine is activated, it reads the content of its input buffers, processes the received data, updates its internal state, writes some output in its output buffers, and goes back to sleep (i.e., starts to wait for the next activation). Reading a message from an input buffer removes the message from the buffer, while writing a message in an output buffer means that the message is appended to the current content of the buffer. Note that each buffer is considered as an output buffer for one machine and an input buffer for another machine. The machines are activated in rounds by a hypothetic scheduler (not illustrated in Figure 1 ). In each round, the scheduler activates the machines in the following order: H, M1, . . . , Mn, A, C. This means that H is activated first, and then, each machine is activated when the previous machine in the sequence went back to sleep. The round ends when C goes back to sleep. Now, we describe the operation of the machines in more detail:
• Machine C: This machine is intended to model the broadcast nature of radio communications. When activated, it first determines a random order of its input buffers, and then, it processes the content of them in this order 2 . Processing the content of an input buffer outi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) consists in reading the content of outi and copying it in inj for all j such that vj ∈ NG(vi). Similarly, processing the content of outA means reading the content of outA and writing it in inj for all j such that vj ∈ NG(ṽ). Clearly, in order for C to be able to work, it needs to be initialized with some random input, denoted by rC , and graph G.
• Machine H: This machine models higher-layer protocols (i.e., protocols above the routing protocol) and ultimately the end-users of the non-corrupted devices. H can initiate a route discovery process at any machine Mi by placing a request (ci, tar ) in buffer req i , where ci is a sequence number used to distinguish between different requests sent to Mi, and tar ∈ L is the identifier of the target of the discovery. A response to this request may be returned via buffer resi. The response has the form (ci, routes), where ci is the sequence number of the corresponding request, and routes is the set of routes returned. In some protocols, routes is always a singleton, in others it is not. If no route found, then routes = ∅.
In addition to req i and resi, H can access buffer ext.
This models an out-of-band channel through which the adversary can instruct an honest party to initiate a route discovery process towards a given target. The messages read from ext have the form ( ini , tar ), where ini , tar ∈ L are the identifiers of the initiator and the target, respectively, of the route discovery requested by the adversary. When H reads ( ini , tar ) from ext, it first checks if ini ∈ L({v1, . . . , vn}). If the verification fails, then H ignores the message, otherwise, it places a request (ci, tar ) in req i where i is the index of the machine Mi which has identifier ini assigned to it (see also the description of how the machines Mi are initialized). In order for this to work, H needs to know which identifier is assigned to which machine Mi (1 ≤ i ≤ n); it receives this information as an input in the initialization phase.
• Machine Mi: The operation of Mi is essentially defined by the routing algorithm. Mi communicates with H via its input buffer req i and its output buffer resi. Through these buffers, it receives requests from H for initiating route discoveries and sends the results of the discoveries to H, as described above.
Mi communicates with the other protocol machines via its output buffer outi and its input buffer ini. Both buffers can contain messages of the form (sndr , rcvr , msg), where sndr ∈ L is the identifier of the sender, rcvr ∈ L ∪ { * } is the identifier of the intended receiver ( * meaning a broadcast message), and msg ∈ M is the actual protocol message. Here, M denotes the set of all possible protocol messages.
In any routing protocol, it must be possible to determine if a protocol message is a route request or a route reply. Hence, there exists a function type : M → {rreq, rrep} that returns the type of any protocol message. In addition, for any protocol message (be it a route request or a route reply), it must also be possible to determine the initiator and the target of the route discovery process to which the message belongs. Therefore, there exist functions ini : M → L and tar : M → L such that ini returns the identifier of the initiator and tar returns the identifier of the target.
When Mi is activated, it first reads the content of req i . For each request (ci, tar ) received from H, it generates a route request msg and updates its internal state according to the routing protocol, and then, it places the message (L(vi), * , msg) in outi.
Once all the requests found in req i have been processed, Mi reads the content of ini. For each message (sndr , rcvr , msg) found in ini, Mi checks if sndr ∈ L(NG(vi)) and rcvr ∈ {L(vi), * }. If these verifications fail, then Mi ignores msg. Otherwise, Mi processes msg and updates its internal state. The way this is done depends on the particular routing protocol in question. Some examples for the processing steps that may be carried out by Mi depending on the type of msg are as follows:
, Mi is not the target of the route discovery), then depending on the content of msg and the current state of Mi, msg may be dropped and no output is generated by Mi. Alternatively, Mi may re-broadcast msg. In this case, Mi generates the appropriate message msg (e.g., appends its identifier to the route accumulated so far in the request) and
Mi is the target of the route discovery), then Mi may generate a route reply msg according to the routing protocol, and place the message (L(vi), , msg ) in outi, where, ∈ L(NG(vi)) is the identifier of the first device on the route that the route reply should follow. We describe the initialization of Mi after describing the adversary's machine A.
• Machine A: This machine represents the adversary. Regarding its communication capabilities, A is identical to any machine Mi, which means that it can read from inA and write in outA much in the same way as Mi can read from and write in ini and outi, respectively. In particular, this means that A cannot eavesdrop messages that were transmitted by devices that are not neighbors of A. It also means that "rushing" is not allowed to A in our model (i.e., A must send its messages in the current round before it receives the messages of the same round from other machines). We intend to extend our model and study the effect of "rushing" in our future work.
While its communication capabilities are similar to that of non-corrupted devices, A may not follow the routing protocol faithfully. In fact, we place no restrictions on the operation of A apart from being polynomialtime in the security parameter k and in the size of the network n. This allows us to consider arbitrary attacks during the analysis. In particular, A may delay or delete messages that it would send if it followed the protocol faithfully. In addition, it can arbitrarily modify messages and generate fake ones.
In addition, A may send an out-of-band request to H by writing in ext as described above. This gives the power to A to specify who starts a route discovery process and towards which target. However, in order to simplify the analysis, we restrict A to send only a single request via ext. This essentially means that a single route discovery process will take place in our model, or in other words, we do not consider parallel runs of the protocol. It is important to emphasize that this restriction is made only to simplify the analysis in this paper; the model itself is sufficiently rich to capture parallel protocol runs by allowing A to send multiple requests via ext. This feature will be exploited in future papers.
As it can be seen from the description above, each Mi should know its own assigned identifier, and those of its
In addition, the machines may need some cryptographic material (e.g., public and private keys) depending on the routing protocol under investigation. We model the distribution of this material as follows. We assume a function I, which takes only random input rI , and it produces a vector I(rI ) = (κ pub , κ1, . . . , κn,κ). The component κ pub is some public information that becomes known to A and all Mi's. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, κi becomes known only to Mi, andκ becomes known only to A. Note that the initialization function can model the out-of-band exchange of initial cryptographic material of both asymmetric and symmetric cryptosystems. In the former case, κ pub contains the public keys of all devices, while κi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) contains the private key of the noncorrupted device corresponding to vi, andκ contains the private key of the corrupted device corresponding toṽ. In the latter case, κ pub is empty, and κi andκ contain the symmetric keys known to the non-corrupted device corresponding to vi and the corrupted device corresponding toṽ, respectively.
Finally, all Mi and A receive some random input in the initialization phase. The random input of Mi is denoted by ri, and that of A is denoted by rA.
The computation ends when H reaches one of its final states. In our simplified case (i.e., when A is restricted to send a single out-of-band request to H), this happens when H reads a response from one of its input buffers resi that corresponds to the single request it placed in req i . The output of sys real conf ,A is the set of routes found in this response. We will denote the output by Out 
Ideal-world model
The ideal-world model that corresponds to a configuration conf = (G,ṽ) and adversary A is denoted by sys ideal conf ,A , and it is illustrated on the right side of Figure 1 . sys ideal conf ,A consists of a set {H, T, A} of interacting Turing machines too, where H is the same as in the real-world model, T is intended to model the ideal operation of the routing protocol, and A is the ideal-world adversary. T and A are probabilistic.
As we mentioned earlier in Section 2, the ideal routing service should never return non-existent routes. Hence the role of T will be to emulate the behavior of the real network, and to ensure that route reply messages that contain non-existent routes are identified and filtered out. This is achieved in the following way: The internal structure of T is identical to the structure of the real-world model (i.e., T runs machines M i and C , which work essentially in the same way as Mi and C do in the real-world model). This ensures that T can emulate the operation of the real network. On the other hand, since C is initialized with G, it can easily identify and mark as corrupted those route reply messages that contain routes that do not exist in G. A corrupted route reply is processed by each machine M i in the same way as a non-corrupted one (i.e., the machines ignore the corruption flag) except for the machine that initiated the route discovery process to which the corrupted route reply belongs. The initiator first performs all the verifications on the route reply that the routing protocol requires, and if the message passes all these verifications, then it also checks if the message is marked as corrupted. If so, then it drops the message, otherwise it continues processing (e.g., returns the received route to H). This means that in the ideal-world model, every route reply that contains a non-existent route is caught and filtered out by the initiator of the route discovery 3 . Since T emulates the operation of the real-world model, the attacks that we allow against T should also be the same as those in the real-world model. Therefore, in our approach, the capabilities of an ideal-world adversary will be identical to that of a real-world adversary. This is why we denote both adversaries by A.
Just like in the real-world model, here as well, the machines operate in a reactive manner. They are activated by a hypothetic scheduler in rounds, and in the following order in each round: H, T , A, T . Note that T is activated twice in each round. The buffers work in the same way as they do in the real-world model.
The operation of H and A is the same as in the real-world model. Now, we describe the operation of T in more detail:
sub-machines, where M i and C are essentially the same as Mi and C, respectively, in the real-world model. The difference between Mi and M i is that M i is prepared to process messages that contain a corruption flag. The difference between C and C is that C attaches a corruption flag to messages that it outputs.
In each round, when activated the first time, T activates machines M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M n in this order. Then it goes back to sleep and waits to be activated the second time. When activated the second time, T activates machine C . When C finishes its task, T goes back to sleep (and the round ends).
The messages that are placed in buffer in i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) by C have the form (sndr , rcvr , (msg, cf )), where sndr , rcvr , and msg are defined in the same way as in the real-world model, and cf ∈ {true, false} is a corruption flag, which indicates whether msg is corrupted (true) or not (false). The messages that are placed in buffers outi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), outA, and inA have the same form as in the real-world model (i.e., they have no corruption flag attached). Note that the input and the output buffers of A contain messages of the same format as in the real-world model, and therefore, a real-world adversary can easily be "plugged in" the ideal-world model. 
then cf is not checked. The messages generated by M i have no corruption flags attached to them, and they are placed in outi.
Just like C, C copies the content of the output buffer of each M i (and A) into the input buffers of the neighbors of M i (and A). However, before copying a message (sndr , rcvr , msg) in any buffer in i , C must attach a corruption flag cf to msg. This is done in the following way:
-if type(msg) = rreq, then C sets cf to false;
-if type(msg) = rrep and all routes carried by msg are existing routes in G, then C sets cf to false;
-otherwise C sets cf to true.
C does not attach corruption flags to messages that are placed in inA.
Before the computation begins, each machine is initialized with some input data. H and A receive the same initial input as in the real-world model. The initialization of T consists in the initialization of all M i and C . Every M i and C receive the same initial input as Mi and C, respectively, in the real-world model.
The computation ends when H reaches one of its final states. Since A is restricted to send a single out-of-band request to H, this happens when H reads a response from one of its input buffers resi that corresponds to the single request it placed in req i . The output of sys ideal conf ,A is the set of routes found in this response. We will denote the output by Out 
Definition of secure routing
Now, we are ready to introduce the definition of secure routing: Intuitively, perfect security of a protocol means that everything that a real-world adversary can achieve against the protocol in the real-world model, an ideal-world adversary can also achieve in the ideal-world model. Since in the idealworld model, the ideal-world adversary cannot achieve that a non-existent route is returned to H, it follows that for perfectly secure protocols, H cannot receive a non-existent route in the real-world model. For statistically secure protocols the same is true with overwhelming probability. For (computationally) secure protocols, the view of the honest parties in the real-world model cannot be efficiently distinguished from their view in the ideal-world model, and therefore, as far as any practical application is concerned, the real-world model is equivalent to the ideal-world model (where non-existent routes are never returned).
routing protocol is said to be (computationally) secure if, for any configuration conf and any real-world adversary A, there exists an ideal-world adversary A , such that Out

Proof techniques
In order to prove the security of a given routing protocol, one has to find the appropriate ideal-world adversary A for any real-world adversary A such that at least Definition 1 is satisfied. In our model, a natural candidate is A = A. This is because for any configuration conf , the operation of sys real conf ,A can easily be simulated by the operation of sys ideal conf ,A assuming that the two systems were initialized with the same random input r. In order to see this, let us assume for a moment that no message is dropped due to its corruption flag being set in sys conf ,A (r). Nevertheless, the definition of statistical security can still be satisfied, if simulation failures occur only with negligible probability. Hence, when trying to prove statistical security, one tries to prove that for any configuration conf and adversary A, the event of dropping a route reply in sys ideal conf ,A due to its corruption flag being set to true can occur only with negligible probability.
Finally, (computational) security can usually be proven in an indirect manner. For this, it is first assumed that Out real conf ,A and Out ideal conf ,A can be distinguished by an efficient algorithm D, and then, a forger is constructed that uses D to break the underlying cryptographic primitive (e.g., a digital signature scheme) of the protocol.
USAGE OF THE MODEL
In this section, we demonstrate the usefulness of our model. In particular, we present as yet unknown attacks against the route discovery part of SRP and Ariadne with signatures, which we have discovered with the help of our model. We also propose a novel protocol, which can be proven to be statistically secure in our model. We provide only sketch of proofs in order to make the presentation easier to follow.
An attack on SRP
Operation of SRP
SRP has been proposed in [19] as an extension header for on-demand source routing protocols such as DSR [15] and the Interzone Routing Protocol of ZRP [11] . In what follows, we assume that SRP is a stand-alone protocol with basic features similar to that of DSR. This makes the presentation simpler, and at the same time, it does not weakens our results.
In SRP, the initiator of the route discovery generates a route request message and broadcasts it to its neighbors. The integrity of this route request is protected by a MAC that is computed with a key shared by the initiator and the target of the discovery. Each intermediate node that receives the route request for the first time appends its identifier to the request and re-broadcasts it. The MAC in the request is not checked by the intermediate nodes (as they do not know the key with which it was computed). When the route request reaches the target of the route discovery, it contains the list of identifiers of the intermediate nodes that passed the request on. This list is considered as a route found between the initiator and the target.
The target verifies the MAC of the initiator in the request. If the verification is successful, then it generates a route reply and sends it back to the initiator via the reverse of the route obtained from the route request. The route reply contains the route obtained from the route request, and its integrity is protected by another MAC generated by the target with a key shared by the target and the initiator. Each intermediate node passes the route reply to the next node on the route (towards the initiator) without modifying it. When the initiator receives the reply it verifies the MAC of the target, and if this verification is successful, then it accepts the route returned in the reply.
The target may receive several route requests that belong to the same route discovery process, and it sends a reply to each of these requests. It is assumed that the initiator waits for some time (possibly defined by a timeout parameter), and then it outputs the set of routes collected from all the replies it received.
Although SRP does not specify it (as it should be part of the base protocol to which SRP is added as an extension), we will nonetheless assume that each node also performs the following verifications when processing SRP messages:
• When a node v receives a route request for the first time, it verifies if the last identifier of the accumulated route in the request corresponds to a neighbor of v. If the accumulated route does not contain any identifiers, then v verifies if the identifier of the initiator corresponds to a neighboring node.
• When a node v receives a route reply, it verifies if its identifier is included in the route carried by the reply. In addition, it also verifies if the preceding identifier (or if there is no preceding identifier, then the identifier of the initiator) and the following identifier (or if there is no following identifier, then the identifier of the target) in the route correspond to neighbors of v.
If these verifications fail, then the message is dropped.
Analysis
In this subsection, we present some observations that we made while we attempted to prove the security of SRP. Instead of a proof of security, these observations has actually led to the discovery of a novel attack against SRP.
In the following discussion, we will refer to the machines that represent the devices in the network by their labels. This does not lead to ambiguity since the labelling function L is a bijection.
Let us suppose that for some configuration conf = (G,ṽ) and adversary A, the following message is received by a noncorrupted machine ini in sys ideal conf ,A : msg = (rrep, ini , tar , id , sn, ( 1, . . . , p) , mac tar ) Let us further suppose that msg has been received with a corruption flag set to true, and that msg passed all the verifications required by SRP at ini . This means that mac tar is correct, 1 is a neighbor of ini , and ( ini , 1, . . . , p, tar ) is a non-existent route in G.
Observation 1. Given that the assumptions above hold, adversary A must have output msg.
Proof. Let us assume that A has never output msg. This means that only non-corrupted machines have output it. In other words, ini received msg from a non-corrupted machine, who received it from another non-corrupted machine, etc. Note that a non-corrupted machine processes msg only if it was sent to it (i.e., a non-corrupted machine does not process overheard messages). Furthermore, passes on msg only if it finds itself in the list ( 1, . . . , p) and if the preceding machine on the list is a neighbor of . All these observations lead to the conclusion that msg must have reached ini by passing through p, . . . , 1. This contradicts with the assumption that ( ini , 1, . . . , p, tar ) is a non-existent route.
Observation 2. Given that the assumptions above hold, machine tar has output msg with overwhelming probability.
Proof. We know from Observation 1 that A has output msg. Let the earliest round in which this happened be ρ. Since mac tar in msg is a correct MAC, A can generate msg by himself only with negligible probability. So, with overwhelming probability, A received msg in round ρ ≤ ρ. Since correct machines apart from tar output msg only if they received it earlier, there must be a round ρ < ρ in which tar generated and output msg.
By assumption, 1 is a neighbor of ini , and ( ini , 1, . . . , p, tar ) is a non-existent route. This means that there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ p such that i and i+1 (where p+1 stands for tar ) are not neighbors.
Observation 3. If i is a non-corrupted machine, then it does not output msg.
Proof. Before outputting msg, i verifies that it is on the list ( 1, . . . , p) and that i+1 is its neighbor. Since the latter does not hold, i drops msg.
Observation 4. If i+1 is a non-corrupted machine, then it does not output msg.
The proof of Observation 4 is similar to that of Observation 3.
In summary, we know that tar has output msg, where msg carries the list of machines ( 1, . . . , p) . We also know that there must be an 1 ≤ i ≤ p such that i and i+1 are not neighbors. In addition, if 1, . . . , p, and tar are all non-corrupted machines, then neither i nor i+1 has output msg. The question is then how msg could reach ini from tar ? The key observation is that A must have output msg. Can A bridge the gap between i and i+1? This is possible if A overhears the transmission of msg by a machine x for some x > i + 1 and can transmit msg to another machine y for some y < i. 
Attack
Let us consider Figure 2 , which illustrates part of a configuration where an attack against SRP based on the above observations is possible. The attacker is denoted by A. The attack scenario is the following: Let us assume that S sends a route request towards D. The request reaches V that rebroadcasts it. Thus, A receives the following route request message:
where id is a randomly generated request identifier, sn is a sequence number maintained by S and D, and mac S is the initiator's MAC. A then broadcasts the following message in the name of X:
where λ is an arbitrary sequence of identifiers. Since Y is a neighbor of A, it will hear the transmission. In addition, since the list of nodes in the message ends with X, which is also a neighbor of Y, it will process the request and rebroadcast it. Later, D sends the following route reply back to S:
where mac D is the MAC of the target. When Y sends this message to X, A overhears the transmission, and forwards the message to V in the name of W. V will accept the message and passes it on towards S. Finally, S will output the route (S, . . . , W, λ, X, . . . , D) , which is clearly a non-existent route.
Note that when A generates msg 2 , it cannot be sure that V and W are neighbors. Similarly, it does not know if X and Y are neighbors. Hence the attack may fail. However, the success probability of the attack is non-negligible, given that V, W, X, and Y are all neighbors of A, and it is known that in this case, the probability that V and W, as well as X and Y are also neighbors is significantly higher than if we just put these nodes on the plane randomly.
An attack on Ariadne with signatures
Operation of Ariadne with signatures
Ariadne has been proposed in [12] as a secure on-demand source routing protocol for ad hoc networks. Ariadne comes in three different flavors corresponding to three different techniques for data authentication. More specifically, authentication of routing messages in Ariadne can be based on TESLA [20] , on digital signatures, or on MACs. We discuss Ariadne with digital signatures.
There are two main differences between Ariadne and SRP. First, in Ariadne not only the initiator and the target authenticate the protocol messages, but intermediate nodes too insert their own digital signatures in route requests. Second, Ariadne uses per-hop hashing to prevent removal of identifiers from the accumulated route in the route request.
The initiator of the route discovery generates a route request message and broadcasts it to its neighbors. The route discovery message contains the identifiers of the initiator and the target, a randomly generated request identifier, and a MAC computed over these elements with a key shared by the initiator and the target. This MAC is hashed iteratively by each intermediate node together with its own identifier using a publicly known one-way hash function. The hash values computed in this way are called per-hop hash values. Each intermediate node that receives the request for the first time re-computes the per-hop hash value, appends its identifier to the list of identifiers accumulated in the request, and generates a digital signature on the updated request. Finally, the signature is appended to a signature list in the request, and the request is re-broadcast.
When the target receives the request, it verifies the perhop hash by re-computing the initiator's MAC and the perhop hash value of each intermediate node. Then it verifies all the digital signatures in the request. If all these verifications are successful, then the target generates a route reply and sends it back to the initiator via the reverse of the route obtained from the route request. The route reply contains the identifiers of the target and the initiator, the route and the list of digital signatures obtained from the request, and the digital signature of the target on all these elements. Each intermediate node passes the reply to the next node on the route (towards the initiator) without any modifications. When the initiator receives the reply, it verifies the digital signature of the target and the digital signatures of the intermediate nodes (for this it needs to reconstruct the requests that the intermediate nodes signed). If the verifications are successful, then it accepts the route returned in the reply.
We assume that every node performs the same verifications on the accumulated routes found in the routing messages as those described in the previous subsection in the context of SRP.
Attack
Due to lack of space, we omit the analysis of Ariadne (the interested reader is referred to [8] ), and we present only the Let us consider Figure 3 , which illustrates part of a configuration where the discovered attack is possible. The attacker is denoted by A. Let us assume that S sends a route request towards D. The request reaches V that re-broadcasts it. Thus, A receives the following route request message:
where id is the random request identifier, h V is the per-hop hash value generated by V, and sig V is the signature of V. A does not re-broadcast msg 1 . Later, A receives another route request from X: 
Later, D generates the following route reply and sends it back towards S:
When A receives this route reply, it forwards it to V in the name of W. Finally, S will output the route (S, . . . , V, W, A, . . . , D), which is a non-existent route.
A provably secure routing protocol
Inspired by Ariadne, we present a routing protocol that can be proven to be statistically secure. We call the protocol endairA (which is the reverse of Ariadne), because instead of signing the route request, we propose that intermediate nodes should sign the route reply. The operation and the messages of endairA are illustrated in Figure 4 .
In endairA, the initiator of the route discovery process generates a route request, which contains the identifiers of the initiator and the target, and a randomly generated request identifier. Each intermediate node that receives the request for the first time appends its identifier to the route accumulated so far, and re-broadcasts the request. When the request arrives to the target, it generates a route reply. The route reply contains the identifiers of the initiator and the target, the accumulated route obtained from the request, and a digital signature of the target on these elements. The reply is sent back to the initiator on the reverse of the route Proof. In order to prove that endairA is statistically secure, it is enough to show that for any configuration conf and any adversary A, a route reply message in sys ideal conf ,A is dropped due to its corruption flag set to true with negligible probability.
Let us suppose that for some configuration conf = (G,ṽ) and adversary A, the following message is received by a noncorrupted machine ini in sys
Let us further suppose that msg has been received with a corruption flag set to true, and that msg passed all the verifications required by endairA at ini . This means that all signatures in msg are correct, 1 is a neighbor of ini , and ( ini , 1, . . . , p, tar ) is a non-existent route in G. It follows that there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ p such that i and i+1 (where p+1 stands for tar ) are not neighbors.
We prove that the above is only possible if A forged the signature of i or i+1. (a) Let us assume that i = A. Then, i is non-corrupted, and it verifies the route in the route reply before signing it. Consequently, it detects that i+1 is not its neighbor and it does not sign the route reply. As other non-corrupted machines do not generate signatures in the name of i, ini can receive msg only if A forged sig i . (b) Now let us assume that i = A. Then, i+1 is noncorrupted, and an argument similar to the one above leads to the conclusion that A must have forged sig i+1 .
It should be intuitively clear that if the signature scheme is secure, then A can forge a signature only with negligible probability, and thus, a route reply message in sys ideal conf ,A is dropped due to its corruption flag set to true only with negligible probability. Nevertheless, we sketch how this could be proven formally. The proof is indirect. We assume that there exist a configuration conf and an adversary A such that a route reply message in sys ideal conf ,A is dropped due to its corruption flag set to true with probability , and then, based on that, we construct a forger F that can break the signature scheme with probability /n. If is non-negligible, then so is /n, and thus, the existence of F contradicts with the assumption on the security of the signature scheme.
The construction of F is the following. Let puk be an arbitrary public key of the signature scheme. Let us assume that the corresponding private key prk is not known to F , but F has access to a signing oracle that produces signatures on submitted messages using prk . F runs a simulation of sys real conf ,A where all machines are initialized as described in the model, except that the public key of a randomly selected non-corrupted machine i is replaced with puk . During the simulation, whenever i signs a message m, F submits m to the oracle, and replaces the signature of i on m with the one produced by the oracle. This signature verifies correctly on other machines later, since the public verification key of i is replaced with puk . By assumption, with probability , the simulation of sys real conf ,A will result in a route reply message msg such that all signatures in msg are correct and msg contains a non-existent route. As we saw above, this means that there exists a non-corrupted machine j such that msg contains the signature sig j of j , but j has never signed (the corresponding part of) msg. Let us assume that i = j. In this case, sig j is a signature that verifies correctly with the public key puk . Since j did not signed (the corresponding part of) msg, F did not call the oracle to generate sig j . This means that F managed to produce a signature on a message that verifies correctly with puk . Since F selected i randomly, the probability of i = j is 1 n , and hence, the success probability of F is /n.
Note that the proof uses only the fact that the adversary has only a single compromised key. In particular, the same proof seems to work for an Active-1-x adversary, which has a single compromised key, but owns several devices in the network.
While we designed endairA purely for demonstration purposes, it has some noteworthy features. Besides being provably secure against an Active-1-1 adversary (and most probably against an Active-1-x adversary too), it is extremely simple and intuitive (e.g., it does not use per-hop hash values). In addition, it requires the nodes to sign only route reply messages, which means that the nodes need to produce orders of magnitude less signatures than in Ariadne, where the route request is signed by every node in the network due to the flooding of the request.
We must also note, however, that endairA is not very resistant against DoS attacks. In particular, it allows the network to be flooded with fake route request messages. However, its resistance to such attacks can be increased by requiring the initiator to sign the request and the intermediate nodes to verify this signature.
RELATED WORK
There are several proposals for secure ad hoc routing protocols (see [14] for a recent overview). However, these proposals come with an informal security analysis with all the pitfalls of informal security arguments. Another set of pa-pers deal with provable security for cryptographic algorithms and protocols (see Parts V and VI of [16] for a survey of the field). However, these papers are not concerned with ad hoc routing protocols. The papers that are the most closely related to the approach we used in this paper are [5] , [23] , and [21] . These papers apply the simulation paradigm for different security problems: [5] and [23] deal with key exchange protocols, and [21] is concerned with security of reactive systems in general, and secure message transmission in particular. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first who applied the notions of provable security and used the simulation-based approach in the context of routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks.
A different approach with similar goals to ours is presented in [25] . The authors of [25] propose a formal model for ad hoc routing protocols with the aim of representing insider attacks (which correspond to our notion of corrupted nodes). Their model is similar to the strand spaces model [10] , which has been developed for the formal verification of key exchange protocols. Routing security is defined in terms of a safety and a liveness property. The liveness property requires that it is possible to discover routes, while the safety property requires that discovered routes do not contain corrupted nodes. In contrast to this, our definition of security allows the protocol to return routes that pass through corrupted nodes. As we mentioned earlier, our definition corresponds to the informal definitions of security given in [19] and [12] . In addition, it seems to be impossible to guarantee that discovered routes do not contain corrupted nodes, since corrupted nodes can behave correctly and follow the routing protocol faithfully.
Another approach, presented in [17] , is based on a formal method, called CPAL-ES, which uses a weakest precondition logic to reason about security protocols. Unfortunately, the work presented in [17] is very much centered around the analysis of SRP, and it is not general enough. For instance, the author defines a security goal that is specific to SRP, but no general definition of routing security is given. In addition, the attack discovered by the author on SRP is not a real attack, because it essentially consists in setting up a wormhole between two non-corrupted nodes, and SRP is not supposed to defend against this. In our opinion, wormhole attacks are attacks against the neighbor discovery mechanism and not against routing. The CPAL-ES analysis of SRP in [17] does not identify the attack presented in Section 4, which we have discovered with our approach. On the other hand, the advantage of the approaches of [17] and [25] is that they can be automated.
Finally, we must mention that SRP has been analyzed by its authors in [19] using BAN logic [6] . However, BAN logic has never been intended for the analysis of routing protocols. The main problem with using BAN logic in this context is that BAN logic assumes that the protocol participants are trustworthy and do not release secrets [7] . This assumption does not hold in the typical case that we are interested in, namely, when there are corrupted nodes in the network controlled by the adversary that may not follow the routing protocol faithfully. It is dangerous to draw conclusions from a BAN analysis of the protocol when the basic assumptions of BAN logic are not satisfied. The fact that the BAN analysis of SRP in [19] was inappropriate is best illustrated by the attack presented in Section 4, which was completely overlooked by the authors of [19] .
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we made the first steps toward a formal model in which one can precisely define what secure routing means and prove (or fail to prove) that a given routing protocol indeed satisfies that definition (under some cryptographic assumptions). Our approach is based on the commonly known simulation paradigm for proving cryptographic protocols correct. The main contribution of the paper is the application of this approach to on-demand source routing protocols proposed for wireless ad hoc networks.
More specifically, we formally defined a real-world and an ideal-world model that capture the basic features of wireless ad hoc networking in general, and ad hoc routing protocols in particular. The real-world model describes the real operation of the routing protocol, while the ideal-world model formalizes the requirement that a secure routing protocol should not return non-existent routes to honest parties. Then, we gave a formal definition of routing security in terms of computational indistinguishability of the two models from the point of view of honest parties.
We demonstrated the usefulness of our approach by analyzing two "secure" ad hoc routing protocols, SRP and Ariadne. This analysis has led to the discovery of as yet unknown attacks against both protocols. Finally, we proposed a novel on-demand source routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks, which can be proven to be secure in our model. This protocol served purely illustrative purposes in this paper, however, it has interesting features that make it worthy to consider by protocol designers when building their future protocols.
In terms of future work, we intend to extend our model to handle parallel protocol runs and Active-x-y adversaries (currently it handles only Active-1-1 adversaries). We also intend to adopt our model for routing protocols that use routing tables instead of source routes (e.g., SEAD [13] and ARAN [22] ).
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